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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY AND RESPONSE
Mr. Taylor raised four issues on appeal: 1) whether there was sufficient evidence to prove
illegal delivery of a controlled substance given the lack of evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or
believed that the plant material in potpourri contained a controlled substance; 2) whether there
was sufficient evidence to prove conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to
deliver a controlled substance given the lack of evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that
the plant material in potpourri contained a controlled substance; 3) whether there was sufficient
evidence to prove conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia,
given the lack of evidence that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that the plant material involved
contained a controlled substance and the consequent lack of proof that the items sold alongside
the plant material were intended to be used in conjunction with a controlled substance; and 4) in
the alternative whether the conviction on Count III should be reversed because the jury was
misdirected concerning the knowledge requirement for the offense of delivery of a controlled
substance. Appellant's Opening Brief at page 9.
In its cross appeal, the State raises the issue of whether the district court's order granting
new trial should be reversed because intent to violate the law is not an element of conspiracy in
Idaho. Respondent's Brief at page 3. 1
This Court should grant appellate relief on Appellant's Issues 1-3 because the lack of
evidence that Mr. Taylor knew the nature of the substance involved is fatal to proof of the State's

I The State entitled its brief "Brief of Respondent" However, the brief is actually
Respondent's Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief. IAR 34. Based upon the State's
denomination of its brief, it is not clear whether the State intends to waive the filing of a Reply
Brief to the Cross-Respondent portion of this Reply Brief/Cross-Respondent's Brief.

charges. In the alternative, the conviction in Count III should be reversed because the district
court misdirected the jury. Relief should be denied to the State in its cross-appeal because the
error advanced on appeal was not preserved in the district court, because, even if the preservation
problem is overlooked, the State cannot demonstrate an abuse of discretion, and further because
intent to violate the law is in fact an element of conspiracy.
A.

The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Delivery

As Mr. Taylor set out in his Opening Brief, I.C. § 37-2732(a) prohibiting delivery
includes a knowledge element. As set out in ICJI 404, to prove delivery, the State must prove: 1)
that the defendant delivered any amount of the named controlled substance to another, and 2) that
the defendant either knew it was the named controlled substance or believed it was a controlled
substance. State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 633, 945 P.2d 1,4 (1997) (knowledge ofthe
nature of the substance possessed is an element of possession of a controlled substance).
Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 9-13. Mr. Taylor further set out the evidence presented by
the State in the district court and noted how none of that evidence went to prove that he knew or
believed the nature of the material he delivered insofar as the State presented no evidence that
Mr. Taylor knew what was in the Twizted potpourri or knew that it contained a Schedule I drug.
Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 13-16.
In the district court, the State did not contest that to prove a violation ofLC. § 372732(a), it must prove that Mr. Taylor knew or believed that the Twizted Potpourri contained a
controlled substance. To the contrary, the State requested that the district court give IClI 404
which included the element that the defendant knew that he was delivering the named controlled
substance or believed that it was a controlled substance. R 183.
2

The court did give the jury instructions as requested by the State. Jury instruction 45
required the jury to find that "the defendant either knew it was a Schedule I synthetic
cannabinoid or believed it was a controlled substance." R 327.
And, in opposition to Mr. Taylor'S motion for judgment of acquittal based upon the
failure of the State to present evidence that Mr. Taylor knew that he was delivering the named
controlled substance or believed that it was a controlled substance, the State did not argue that it
could convict Mr. Taylor without proof that he knew the nature ofthe substance delivered.
Rather, the State argued "However, each Defendant made statements that combined with all the
other evidence presented at trial clearly reflects their knowledge either that Twitzed Potpourri
was, or contained, synthetic cannabinoids or that they believed it was a controlled substance." R
375.
The district court, as set out here and in the Opening Brief, erroneously denied Mr.
Taylor's motion for acquittal on the basis that it believed that the State had presented evidence
that Mr. Taylor knew he was dealing with a synthetic cannabinoid. R 424-425.
On appeal, the State now argues for a different standard. The State argues that "lack of
knowledge that the substance possessed was illegal is irrelevant." Respondent's Brief at page 45. The State makes no attempt to argue that it presented sufficient evidence to prove that Mr.
Taylor believed that the substance possessed was a controlled substance. Rather, it appears to
concede that it did not. Respondent's Brief at pages 4-5.
Instead of contesting that it did present sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Taylor
believed that the substance possessed was a controlled substance, the State argues for a holding
by this Court that all the State had to prove was that Mr. Taylor knew that he delivered a

3

substance that was "a synthetic marijuana" even in the absence of any proof that Mr. Taylor
knew that synthetic marijuana is a controlled substance or that he knew the particular chemical
fonnula of the synthetic marijuana possessed. Respondent's Brief at page 5 ("In this case the
district court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish Taylor's knowledge that the
'potpourri' he was in the business of selling was a synthetic marijuana."). The State's argument
fails for at least two reasons - first, it is based upon the false premise that all "synthetic
marijuana" is illegal; and second, it is contrary to the law of Idaho.
As set out at pages 16-17 of Appellant's Opening Brief, not all synthetic cannabinoids are
included in Idaho's Schedule I. I.e. § 37-2705. Thus, even if the State proved that Mr. Taylor
knew that the potpourri contained a "synthetic marijuana," (which it did not, as set out in Mr.
Taylor's Opening Brief) that proof would be insufficient to prove that Mr. Taylor knew that he
was delivering a Schedule I substance. 2
Secondly, the State's argument is contrary to the case law ofIdaho. Idaho requires that
the defendant must know the nature of the material possessed in order to prove a drug violation.
State v. Lamphere, supra (knowledge of the nature of the substance possessed is an element of

possession of a controlled substance); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242,985 P.2d 117, 122
(1999) (possession of a substance that the defendant truly, although negligently, believed to be
hannless would be without criminal intent, requiring an acquittal); State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho
174, 178,953 P.2d 614,618 (1998), Schroder, J. concurring, ("[I]fa person possesses a

Of note, the State makes no effort whatsoever in its brief to argue that Schedule I, I.e. §
37-2705, includes all synthetic marijuana. The State simply assumes the premise without
argument or citation to any authority either in the statute or the case law. See State v. Zichko, 129
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,971 (1996); IAR 35(b)(6) requiring the argument in the
Respondent's Brief to include citations to the authorities and statutes relied upon.
2

4

controlled substance in the mistaken belief that it is a different substance that is in fact legal to
possess, there is no violation ofthe law."); State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64-5, 122 P.3d
321,323-4 (Ct. App. 2005), ("Thus, the defendant's ignorance ofthe presence of the substance,
or mistaken beliefthat it was a innocuous material, if believed by the jury, would be
exculpatory."); State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 132 P.3d 455 (Ct. App. 2005), "[O]ne might
possess an illegal drug under the mistaken belief that it was a legal substance ... In such a case
the defendant's mistake of fact, if believed by the jury, requires an acquittal because the criminal
intent element of the offense is not present."; State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 129 P.2d 1262 (Ct.
App. 2005) (approving an instruction which, unlike the instruction in Blake, did not allow a
conviction if the defendant was unaware the substance possessed was a controlled substance).
The State does not cite any of the above controlling case law other than Blake in its brief.
Respondent's Brief at p. iii-iv. And, the State's reference to Blake is somewhat confusing. Blake
does state, in accord with State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924,866 P.2d 181 (1993), as the State notes in
its brief, that an individual need not know that the substance possessed is a controlled substance.
However, Blake clarifies the meaning of this assertion - holding that while the defendant need
not know that the substance is on the list of controlled substances, a conviction does require
proof that the defendant knew the nature of the substance possessed. In Blake, the jury was
instructed that it could convict so long as it found Blake knew that there was some substance
under his car seat and something in his wallet, but truly, although negligently, believed the
substance was not methamphetamine or cocaine. The Supreme Court reversed Blake's
conviction and remanded for a new trial because a controlled substances conviction requires
proof of knowledge of the nature of the substance involved. Blake, 133 Idaho at 240-242,985
5

P.2d at 120-122.
Although the State appears to regard its argument to this Court as a straightforward and
simple application of Fox, the State is actually asking this Court to make a radical determination
- that Schedule I includes all synthetic marijuana, including forms of synthetic marijuana not
existing at the time it was enacted and that proof by the State that someone knows that a
substance may provide some sort of high, without knowing anything else about the nature of the
substance, is sufficient to prove knowledge that the substance is synthetic marijuana.
This radical determination is not supported by Schedule I itself. See I.C. §§ 372705(3)(i)(a); 37-2709(g)(1); and 37-2707(f)(1). Had the Idaho Legislature intended to define
any substance which might provide some sort of high as an illegal drug, it would have adopted a
statute akin to South Dakota's which prohibits ingestion of "any substance, except alcoholic
beverages as defined in § 35-1-1, for purposes of becoming intoxicated, unless such substance is
prescribed by a practitioner ofthe medical arts [.]" S.D. Codified Laws § 22-42-15 (2012).3
Idaho has not chosen to enact such broad legislation. This Court should reject the State's request
to broaden Idaho's legislation to be the equivalent of South Dakota's.
Furthermore, the State's request implicitly asks this Court to reject and overrule all the
case law cited above requiring proof of knowledge of the nature of the substance involved for a
controlled substances violation. Of course, only the state Supreme Court can overrule its cases,
including Lamphere and Blake. Perhaps more importantly, however, rejecting the requirement
that the State present evidence to prove that the defendant knew the nature of the substance

3 South Dakota defines "intoxication" as "a disturbance of mental or physical capacities
resulting from the introduction of substances into the body." S.D. Codified laws § 22-1-2 (21).
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involved will open the door for the conviction of people the State has no legitimate or public
policy interest in convicting, specifically people who believe that the material they possess is
mnocuous.
Mr. Taylor asks this Court to, consistently with prior case law, hold that an essential
element of delivery is proof of the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the substance
possessed. He further asks that this Court hold that the State did not present substantial evidence
upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the State sustained the burden of
proving this knowledge of the nature of the substance delivered beyond a reasonable doubt.
Based on the lack of proof, Mr. Taylor requests that the conviction for delivery be reversed and
an acquittal entered. State v. Curry, 153 Idaho 394, 283 P.3d 141 (Ct. App. 2012).
B.

The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Conspiracy to Manufacture,
Deliver or Possess With Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance

The second issue Mr. Taylor presents on appeal is whether the evidence was insufficient
to prove conspiracy to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled
substance. Mr. Taylor's Opening Brief sets out that an acquittal should be entered on this charge
because the State's evidence was insufficient to prove an agreement to accomplish an illegal
objective and the requisite intent to commit the underlying substantive offense. Appellant's
Opening Brief, p. 18-21.
In response, the State appears to rely upon its argument that it need not prove that Mr.
Taylor had knowledge of the nature of the substance that was the object of the alleged
conspiracy. See Respondent's Brief generally. The State also appears to rely on its argument set
out in support of its cross-appeal that "knowledge of or intent to violate the law is simply not an

7

element of conspiracy under Idaho law." Respondent's Brief at page 10. However, as will be
discussed below, and as was acknowledged by the State in the district court, intent to violate the
law is in fact an element of conspiracy.
This Court should reject the State's argument that it need not prove that Mr. Taylor had
knowledge of the nature of the substance that was the object of the alleged conspiracy because
that argument is contrary to the case law and statutes discussed above. This Court should further
reject the State's argument that intent to violate the law is not an element of conspiracy. And,
lastly, this Court should note that the State has made no effort whatsoever to argue that the record
establishes that it presented sufficient proof either ofMr. Taylor's knowledge of the nature of the
substance involved or of his intent to violate the law. Respondent's Brief.
Therefore, this Court should find that the evidence is constitutionally insufficient to
support the conviction for conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver a
controlled substance.
C.

The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Conspiracy to Deliver or Possess
With Intent to Deliver Drug Paraphernalia

Mr. Taylor set out in his Opening Briefhow the evidence was insufficient to prove
conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia. Appellant's Opening
Brief at pages 21-23.
As with the conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to deliver a
controlled substance, the State does not respond directly to Mr. Taylor's arguments, but rather
appears to rely on its contention that it need not prove knowledge of the nature of the substance
possessed or an intent to violate the law to prove this conspiracy charge. Respondent's Brief

8

generally. That reliance is misplaced as discussed in the Opening Brief and this Brief. For those
reasons, Mr. Taylor asks that an acquittal be entered on this charge.
D.

If an Acquittal is Not Entered in Count III, the Conviction Must
Nonetheless be Reversed Because the Jury Was Misdirected

Mr. Taylor has set out why if this Court declines to enter an acquittal in Count III, a new
trial should nonetheless be granted. Appellant's Opening Briefpages 23-28. The State has
responded with its same argument that it was not obliged to offer proofthat Mr. Taylor knew the
nature ofthe substance he possessed. Respondent's Briefpage 6.
For the same reasons discussed above, this Court should reject the State's argument and
for the reasons set out in the Opening Brief grant a new trial on Count III.
E.

The State's Cross-Appeal Argument Seeking Vacation of the Order
Granting a New Trial Should be Rejected Because the Issue Advanced on
Appeal Was Not Preserved in the District Court

In its cross-appeal, the State presents the issue of whether the district court's order
granting a new trial should be reversed because intent to violate the law is not an element of
conspiracy in Idaho. Respondent's Brief at page 3.
However, in the district court, the State repeatedly told the court that intent to violate the
law is an element of conspiracy in Idaho and did not raise the argument it now raises on appeal.
In his memorandum in support of his motion for a new trial on the conspiracy counts, Mr.
Taylor argued:
... the jury did just as the jury instructions required them to do - if they found
that Mr. Taylor participated in the acts alleged, it didn't matter whether he knew it
was illegal or not, the only possible verdict was guilty. Such a finding is contrary
to the law ...
R 350-351.
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Mr. Taylor continued his argument, stating that to prove conspiracy, the State was
required to prove that Mr. Taylor and his alleged co-conspirators entered into an agreement with
malevolent purposes, but Jury Instruction 27, which stated that when the evidence shows that a
person voluntarily did that which the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense that the person
did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person believed it to be lawful, removed that
element. R 354.
In response, the State did not argue as it now does that intent to violate the law is not an
element of conspiracy in Idaho. Rather, the State argued, "From the State's perspective, there
was no evidence presented that the Defendants' did not know that they were involved in the
manufacture, distribution and/or possession with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, to wit:
a synthetic cannabinoids." (Emphasis and punctuation original). In the same paragraph, the
State set out the law: "As articulated by the Defense Motion for New Trial and as this Court is
aware, Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, meaning, each Defendant entered into an agreement
to commit the manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance, to
with: synthetic cannabinoids." R 383. The State concluded with an argument that the jury was
given a mistake of fact instruction and so did not convict without finding specific intent.
"Therefore, had the jury believed that each Defendant did not have the specific intent required for
Conspiracy, they had all the appropriate instructions to find each Defendant not guilty as well as
an added instruction that the State opposed, and submits was not based upon evidence presented
at trial, that would have supported said not guilty verdict." R 384.

4

4 In fact, the State's position that conspiracy requires proof of specific intent began with
the Indictment in this case. The State's Indictment alleges that Mr. Taylor and others "did
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In his reply to the State's response in the district court, Mr. Taylor further supported his
argument that to prove conspiracy the State must prove that Mr. Taylor was aware of the criminal
purpose of the agreement. "He cannot be guilty of planning and agreeing to commit a crime that
he did not intend to commit." R 390.
The State's theory in the district court was not that it did not have to prove intent to
commit a crime, but rather that the jury instructions were correct and even included a mistake of
fact instruction, and that it had proven, as required to prove conspiracy, an intent to deliver a
controlled substance - specifically synthetic marijuana. 5
It is only now, for the first time on appeal, that the State argues that "knowledge of or

intent to violate the law is simply not an element of conspiracy under Idaho law." Respondent's
Briefp. 10. And, the State now asserts, for that reason, rather than the fact that it did prove
intent, the district court erred in granting a new trial. Respondent's Brief at page 14.
In general, issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209,224-225,245 P.3d 961, 976-977 (2010). And, an objection to an order of the
district court does not preserve all claims and theories of error in the order. For example, an
objection that restitution was not statutorily authorized for time attendant to controlled buys from
another defendant or warranted because hours worked appeared inflated, and that the statute did
not allow restitution for hours spent testifYing at the restitution hearing did not preserve the issue

willfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate and agree to manufacture, deliver and/or
possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance ... " R 14. The State did not allege that Mr.
Taylor and others did conspire to manufacture, deliver and/or possess with intent to deliver a
substance that they mayor may not have known to be a controlled substance.
5 The State's argument in the district court, just as its argument here, rests on a false
premise - that Schedule I bans all synthetic marijuana.
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of whether restitution could be awarded for allotted fringe benefits including officer vacation
pay. State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833,252 P.3d 563,566 (Ct. App. 2010). See also, State
v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407,825 P.3d 501,504 (1991), holding that a motion to suppress that

alleged a violation of the state constitution but did not further clarifY the state constitutional
argument did not preserve the issue of whether the search violated Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The
only exception to the preservation requirement is Perry's fundamental error analysis. But that
analysis only applies to defendants who can demonstrate that the error violated one or more of
the defendants' unwaived constitutional rights. Perry, supra. As the State is not a defendant nor
can it assert a violation of unwaived constitutional rights, its unpreserved issue of whether
knowledge of or intent to violate the law is an element of conspiracy in Idaho cannot be heard on
appeal. Id.
For these reasons, the State's request for relief on cross-appeal should be denied.
F.

If This Court Reaches the Issue, the State Cannot Establish That the
District Court Abused its Discretion in Granting a New Trial on the
Conspiracy Counts

Should this Court determine to hear the State's appeal despite its failure to preserve its
issue in the district court, relief should nonetheless be denied because the State cannot establish
an abuse of discretion.
"A district court has wide discretion to grant or disallow a new trial, and on appeal, [the]
Court will not disturb that exercise of discretion absent a showing of manifest abuse." State v.
Mack, 132 Idaho 481, 483, 974 P.2d 1109, 1112 (et. App. 1999).

The State recognizes the abuse of discretion standard in its brief, citing State v. Jones,
127 Idaho 478,903 P.2d 67 (1995), and State v. Eddins, 142 Idaho 423,128 P.3d 960 (Ct. App.
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2006). Respondent's Brief at page 7.
The State then notes that the interpretation and construction of a statute presents
questions of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. The State cites two cases
for this standard of review: State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 102 P.3d 1115 (2004), and State

v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,94 P.3d 709 (Ct. App. 2004). Respondent's Brief at page 7. Neither
case involves appellate review of a motion for a new trial and the State does not address how the
free review applied to the interpretation and construction of a statute applies to its appeal from
the grant of a motion for a new trial wherein the question of law it argues was wrongly decided is
a question of first impression in Idaho.
As is well established, a district court does not abuse its discretion if it correctly perceives
the question before it as requiring the exercise of discretion, it acts within the outer boundaries of
its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
presented to it, and it arrives at its decision through an exercise of reason. State v. Jones, 127
Idaho at 481,903 P.2d at 70.
So, for example, in Jones, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence when its decision was based upon its finding
that statements in a doctor's report would not probably produce an acquittal if a new trial were
granted. Jd. In Mack, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on its
correct determination that the jury should have been instructed regarding the necessity for
corroboration of accomplice testimony. In Eddins, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when, in a question of first impression, it adopted a majority rule from other jurisdictions, with
which the appellate court agreed.

13

But, it does not appear that there is any decision holding that a district court abuses its
discretion when it makes a reasoned decision on a matter of first impression simply because the
appellate court if presented with the legal question itself would have ruled differently.
A case of first impression is "A case that presents the court with an issue of law that has
not previously been decided by any controlling legal authority in that jurisdiction." Black's Law
Dictionary 243 (9 th ed. 2004).
When a legal question is a matter of first impression, the duty of a criminal defense
attorney at the trial level is limited to alerting the client that there is an open question of law that
may carry a risk for the client. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1483
(2010). Likewise, neither a trial nor an appellate attorney will be found to have offered deficient
performance as measured by Strickland's6 objective standard of reasonableness when he or she
fails to argue a novel theory in an undeveloped area of law. Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 89-90,
190 P.3d 906, 910-911 (Ct. App. 2008); Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622,630,226 P.3d 1269,
1277 (2010).
And, when a legal question is a matter of first impression in a civil case, attorney fees will
not be awarded against the party whose position is ultimately rejected by the appellate court .
. . . attorney fees are only appropriate if this Court determines that the other party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. When dealing with an issue of
first impression, this Court is generally reluctant to find an action unreasonable.

Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board o/Commissioners, 151 Idaho 123, 135,254 P.3d 24,36
(2011 ) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The underlying logic of the ineffective assistance of counsel cases and the attorney fees

6

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).
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cases is that when confronted with an issue of first impression reasonable minds can differ; a
decision maker, whether a lawyer determining which legal theories and cases to pursue, or a
district court in deciding a novel issue of law, may reach, by an exercise of reason, a result that
the appellate courts will disagree with. But, the fact that the decision reached is not the same
decision the appellate court would have reached does not render the process by which the
decision maker acted either unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.
In this case, the question of whether in Idaho the intent element of conspiracy requires
proof of knowledge that the act agreed to is criminal is an issue of first impression. The closest
Idaho's appellate courts have corne to addressing this question is in State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho
684,201 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2008). In Rolon, the Court of Appeals held that conspiracy is a
specific intent crime that requires the intent to agree or conspire and the intent to commit the
offense which is the object of the conspiracy. 145 Idaho at 692, 201 P.3d at 665. Hence, in that
case, jury instructions which allowed Rolon to be found guilty of conspiring to traffic in more
than 28 grams of cocaine and heroin by relying on the amounts actually delivered by the local
distribution ring, regardless of whether the State proved he actually agreed to traffic in those
amounts were erroneous. However, the error was harmless because based upon the evidence
presented no rational juror could have found for Rolon on the question of his intent to traffic in at
least 28 grams. 146 Idaho at 693, 201 P.3d at 666.
As the issue presented in this case is one of first impression, even if this Court determines
that it would have decided the issue differently than did the trial court, the trial court's decision is
not an abuse of discretion unless the court did not perceive that the matter before it required the
exercise of its discretion, did not act within the outer boundaries of that discretion, or did not
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arrive at its decision through an exercise of reason. State v. Jones, supra.
In this case, an abuse of discretion did not occur. The district court clearly understood
that the decision to grant or deny a new trial lay within its discretion. See Memorandum
Decision stating "Granting or denying a new trial is within the discretion of the court." R 426.
The court acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion. See Memorandum Decision R
428-431. And, the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
Given that it cannot establish an abuse of discretion, the State's request for appellate
relief should be denied.
G.

If This Court Reaches the Issue, it Should Hold That Conspiracy Does
Require Knowledge of or Intent to Violate the Law

As discussed above, the State did not preserve this issue for appeal and so relief should be
denied. In the second alternative, the State cannot show an abuse of discretion and so relief
should be denied. In the third alternative, this Court should hold that conspiracy requires
knowledge of or an intent to violate the law and so the State should be denied relief. Otherwise,
every postal carrier who agrees to deliver envelopes and packages is, when those envelopes and
packages contain contraband, guilty of conspiracy to deliver contraband - even though the postal
service clearly advises all patrons that prohibited material may not be placed in the mail. See
www.usps.comlship/prepare-domestic-shipments.htm.
Idaho Code § 18-1701 states:
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit any crime or offense
prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, and one (1) or more of such persons
does any act to effect the object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be
punishable upon conviction in the same matter and to the same extent as is
provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of the crime or
offenses that each combined to commit.
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Although it does not reach the particular question posed by the State in this case whether knowledge of or intent to violate the law is simply not an element of conspiracy - State
v. Rolon, supra, it discusses from a different perspective the intent element of the offense. In that
case, Rolon was charged with conspiracy to traffic in more than 28 grams of heroin and
conspiracy to traffic in more than 28 grams of cocaine. On appeal he argued that the jury had
been misdirected because the instructions permitted a finding of guilt based up reliance on the
amounts actually delivered by the local distribution ring regardless of whether Rolon had actually
agreed to traffic in those quantities. Rolon argued that the instructions were erroneous because
they allowed conviction without proof of knowledge of, and thus specific intent to agree to traffic
in amounts greater than 28 grams. 146 Idaho at 688, 201 P.3d at 661. And, the Court of Appeals
agreed.
The Court held that the State was required to prove that: (1) Rolon and at least one other
person agreed to traffic in 28 grams or more each of heroin and cocaine; (2) at least one of the
conspirators performed some act in furtherance ofthe agreement, and (3) Rolon had the requisite
intent to traffic in heroin and cocaine. 146 Idaho at 690, 201 P.3d at 663. The Court then found
that the instructions gave the jury the impression that only a general intent was required - but that
conspiracy is a specific intent crime. The Court wrote:
Negating the specific intent element amounts to fundamental error. A general
criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly
performed the proscribed acts, but a specific intent requirement refers to the state
of mind which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof. In other words,
specific intent requires not only the doing of an act, but the performance of that
act with the intent to cause the proscribed result. While an Idaho court has not
explicitly held as much, it is generally accepted that conspiracy is a specific intent
crime that requires the intent to agree and conspire and the intent to commit the
offense which is the object of the conspiracy ....
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146 Idaho at 691, 201 P.3d at 664 (citations omitted).
"Specific intent requires not only the doing of an act, but the performance of that act with
intent to cause the proscribed result." Id. If performance of the act with intent to cause the
proscribed result has any meaning at all, it must mean that an innocent actor - one who is
ignorant of what he was doing and of the illegality of doing it - cannot be guilty of conspiracy.
So, a postal carrier delivering a letter which contains, unbeknownst to her, contraband, cannot be
guilty of conspiracy to deliver contraband. Likewise, Mr. Taylor, in this case, cannot be guilty of
conspiring to deliver a controlled substance in the absence of proof that he knew the nature ofthe
substance he was conspiring to deliver.
The State's argument that it need not show knowledge or intent to violate the law to
prove conspiracy loops back around to and is dependent upon its argument that it need not show
that a defendant in a delivery case was aware of the nature of the material delivered. See
Respondent's Brief at page 11, footnote 2 - arguing that ignorance or mistake of law is not a
defense to burglary, forgery or possession with intent to deliver. As was discussed in the
Opening Brief and above in this Brief this case involves a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law.
The State failed to present proof that Mr. Taylor was aware of the fact that the material in the
store contained cannabinoids included in Schedule I. That is a matter of fact and a failure of
proof, not a mistake of law.
The State looks to United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 95 S.Ct. 1255 (1975), to support
its argument that it need not show any knowledge or intent to violate the law to prove conspiracy.
Feola was convicted of conspiracy to assault federal officers. The federal law prohibiting assault
on a federal officer did not require proof of knowledge that the victim of the assault was a federal
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officer. Therefore, the Supreme Court held, proof of conspiracy to violate the federal law did not
require proof of knowledge that the planned victim of the planned assault was a federal officer.
But, Feola does not say that when the alleged conspiracy is to commit an offense that
does require proof of some level of knowledge or intent that the conspiracy may be proven
without reference to whether the State can prove the level of knowledge or intent needed to prove
the underlying offense. And, indeed, the State has not cited any case that so holds.
Feola only holds that a conspiracy to commit a general intent crime only requires the

conspirator to share the general intent. Thus, it is not apposite to the specific intent crimes
charged here.
In Idaho, the law is that if a person possesses a controlled substance in the mistaken belief
that it is a different substance that is legal to possess, there is no violation of the law. State v.
Lamphere, supra;, State v. Blake, supra; State v. Armstrong, supra; State v. Stefani, supra; State

v. Hopper, supra. The State is requesting this Court to now hold that even though there is no

violation of the law if a person possesses a controlled substance in the mistaken belief that he
possessed a different substance that is legal to possess, the person can still be guilty of conspiracy
because the State need not prove knowledge or intent to prove conspiracy.
The State can cite no case law that would support such a holding. Feola does not support
its position. Nor does United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 330 (5 th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9 th Cir. 1996); United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10 th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47,55-56 (2 nd Cir. 1980); or People v. McLaughlin, 245 P.2d

1076 (CaL App., 2d Dist. 1952) - the cases cited by the State in its brief. Respondent's Brief at
pages 12-13. Rather, all those cases stand for the proposition that the same intent is required to
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commit conspiracy as to commit the underlying offense. Not one of these cases holds that if a
person is not guilty of the underlying offense because of a mistake of fact, he can nonetheless be
guilty of conspiracy.
And, indeed, such a holding is contrary to public policy. To return to the postal carrier
example - no State interest is furthered by convicting a postal carrier of conspiracy to deliver a
controlled substance when the postal carrier delivers mail in the mistaken belief that the mail
does not contain controlled substances. A conspiracy conviction under those conditions would
not further the goal of protecting society from the dangers of concerted criminal activity nor
would it serve to stop the actual commission of a crime after criminal intent has crystallized, but
the substantive crime has not yet been committed. Feola, 410 U.S. at 694,95 S.Ct. at 1268,
setting out the two purposes of conspiracy statutes. Conviction of the postal carrier or conviction
of a person who does not know the nature of the material he possesses does nothing to protect the
public but rather hurts those convicted and wastes public resources that are needed elsewhere.
Mr. Taylor asks this Court to reject the State's assertion that knowledge of or intent to
violate the law is not an element of conspiracy under Idaho law and to leave in place the order
granting a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION
As set forth in the Opening Brief and above, the conviction on Count III should be
vacated and an acquittal entered because the evidence was insufficient to prove the element of
knowledge. Likewise, the convictions on the two conspiracy charges should be vacated and
acquittals entered because the evidence was insufficient to prove an agreement to accomplish an
illegal objective and to prove the requisite intent to commit the underlying crimes. In the
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alternative, the conviction on Count III should be reversed because the jury was misdirected so
that the State's burden of proof of knowledge was negated.
In addition, the State's argument on cross appeal that knowledge of or intent to violate the
law is not an element of conspiracy under Idaho law should not be heard because it was not
preserved for appellate review. Moreover, even if it could be heard, it is without merit both
because the State cannot show an abuse of discretion and also because knowledge of or intent to
violate the law is an element of conspiracy.
Respectfully submitted

this~~~ay of October, 2013.
Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Matthew T
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